have attempted to empirically test aspects of this argument. Of these, only Gurr (1994) has addressed it with respect to ethnic conflict. 2 Accordingly, the purpose of this work is to examine Huntington's predictions of a general rise in civilizational conflict in the post-Cold War era with an emphasis on the predication that clashes
Introduction
involving the Western and Islamic civilizations, and especially conflicts between the two, will be among the most common and intense forms of civilizational conflict.
It is important to acknowledge the considerable controversy surrounding most aspects of Huntington's theory, including those tested here. Many dispute that civilizations will be the basis for international politics and conflict in the post-Cold War era. 3 Also, while his predictions of increased Islamic-Western clashes seem to be among the most widely accepted aspects of Huntington's theory, this element of his predictions is also under considerable dispute. 4 However, this debate will not be further rehashed here, except to mention that the arguments against Huntington include the null hypothesis that civilizational conflicts will not increase, and that conflicts within civilizations will be more common both in general (Rosecrance, 1998; Tipson, 1997) and specifically within the Islamic civilization (Kader, 1998; Monshipouri, 1998) .
Research Design
It is important to note that the empirical testing presented here focuses on ethnic conflicts within states, which are a subset of a type of conflict Huntington calls 'fault line' conflicts. These are conflicts between civilizations where they happen to border each other. This analysis does not address 'fault line' conflicts between states which border each other or any other international conflicts.
This analysis uses data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 (MAR3) dataset as well as additional data collected for this study. The unit of analysis in this dataset is the minority group within a state. For each of the 275 cases, there is a minority and a majority group. Thus, the same majority group and the same minority may appear several times in the dataset. What is unique to each case is that the same pair of majority and minority groups do not appear more than once. See Gurr (2000: 7-13 ) for a full discussion of the criteria for inclusion in the MAR dataset as well as a discussion of the reasoning behind those criteria.
There are two criticisms of the use of the MAR data to test Huntington's theory that should be addressed. First, the dataset does not contain data on all ethnic minorities. While this criticism is accurate, it does not exclude the data from being relevant. This is because, as Gurr (2000: 10-13) argues, it contains a reasonable representation of the universe of ethnic minorities which are engaged in conflict. Since the purpose of this study is to assess the extent of change in conflict since the end of the Cold War, this dataset is sufficient to do so. Second, in focusing on ethnic conflict, the data do not include all domestic conflicts, including civil wars such as the one in Algeria. I argue that this is not a problem because nearly all domestic civilizational conflicts are also ethnic conflicts. This is because Huntington's definition of civilizations is basically the journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 38 / number 4 / july 2001 460 3 For example, Ajami (1993) and Gray (1998) argue that the majority of conflicts, and thus the primary level of identity, will remain at the state level. Also, many, including Rosecrance (1998) and Yamazaki (1996) , argue that most conflicts will be within civilizations. There are also many, including Ikenberry (1997) and Smith (1993) , who argue that the world is becoming a global society and, thus, people will identify themselves primarily as world citizens. Others, like Walt (1997) , argue that things will remain as they have been. 4 There are several arguments opposing Huntington's predictions with regard to the Islamic civilization. First, some, like Bartley (1993) and Esposito (1995) , argue that Huntington mistakes conflicts caused by other factors with civilizational conflict. Second, some, like Fuller & Lesser (1996) and Halliday (1996) , argue that Islam is not the threat many believe it to be. Third, others, like Kirkpatrick et al. (1993) and Mahbubani (1993) , argue that the West is being embraced by other civilizations. Fourth, others, including Kader (1998) and Monshipouri (1998) , argue that conflicts occur more often within the Islamic civilization than between it and other civilizations. Fifth, Hunter (1998) adds that the rise in Islamic fundamentalism is not unique to the Islamic civilization and, furthermore, the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism is waning. On the other hand, even some of Huntington's critics like Hassner (1997) and Heilbrunn (1998) believe there may be some truth to Huntington's arguments with regard to clashes between the Western and Islamic civilizations. aggregation of many more specific ethnic identities into a more general civilizational identity. Because of this, any two groups that are of different civilizations should also be of different ethnicities, and any conflict within the same ethnic group should also be within civilizations. While the MAR3 data may not contain all domestic conflicts, as noted above, it is a reasonably accurate list of all ethnic conflicts and, therefore, should be missing very few, if any, domestic civilizational conflicts. Given this, the MAR3 data should provide a reasonable basis for testing Huntington's theory.
Because the MAR3 dataset does not include codings for civilizations, each minority and majority group in the dataset was assigned a civilization for the purposes of this study. There were many cases where Huntington's criteria for his civilizations were unclear, necessitating either the interpretation or extension of his theory in order to code the cases. Since Huntington's civilizations seem to be mostly divided by religion, wherever possible religion was the deciding factor. Where religion could not be the deciding factor, other methods for fitting the groups in the MAR3 dataset into Huntington's categories were used.
First, Huntington seems to be ambivalent over the inclusion of Buddhism in the Confucian/Sinic civilization. On one hand, the Buddhist civilization appears on his map of 'The World of Civilizations: Post-1990' (Huntington, 1996a: 26-27) . He also refers to the Buddhist civilization in several other places. However, for operational purposes, Buddhist groups are coded here as part of the Confucian/Sinic civilization because (1) Huntington does not include Buddhism in his listing of civilizations in his Foreign Affairs article, (2) Huntington (1996a: 45-48 ) also does not include it in his listing of civilizations in his book, (3) he includes 'the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea', which are countries with Buddhist majorities, in the Sinic/Confucian civilization (Huntington, 1996a: 45) , and (4) finally, and most importantly, he concludes that 'Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization' (Huntington, 1996a: 48) .
Second, Huntington does not deal with several religions, including the Jewish, Druze, Sikh, and Baha'i religions. The Jewish majority in Israel is coded as Western because the Middle Eastern Islamic states consider it a Western created imperialist intrusion into Islamic territory. In addition, it is telling that Israel has been excluded from the Asian section of the UN and is seeking to become part of the European section. The Druze, Sikh, and Baha'i religions are all offshoots of Islam and, therefore, coded as part of the Islamic civilization.
Third, are the Afro-Americans in the USA and several Latin American states part of the African identity group, or are they sufficiently assimilated into their local cultures to be considered part of them? Reasonable arguments can be made for either case. For operational purposes, these groups are considered part of the African civilization because there are many indications, especially in the USA, that many Afro-Americans consider themselves to have a distinct identity which is, in part, tied to their African origins. 5 This common identity seems to be the key factor in Huntington's definition of the African civilization, which is unique from his definitions of the other civilizations in that it is wholly based on identity and culture and has no obvious religious component. It is important to note, however, that this is an extension of Huntington's theory. It is argued here that this extension is necessary because Huntington did not address this issue.
Fourth, a similar question arises for black
Muslim groups in Africa. Are they part of the African or Islamic civilizations? Since this issue can be decided by religion, these groups are considered Islamic. That Huntington's (1996a: 26-27 ) map of world civilizations includes North Africa in the Islamic civilization is consistent with this assessment. Fifth, the Gagauz in Moldova are Orthodox Christian but not European in origin. Here, too, religion was the deciding factor, and they are therefore included in the SlavicOrthodox civilization.
Sixth, there are many minority groups that are of mixed origins. The Roma minorities in Europe are an excellent example. These groups were coded as 'mixed', and clashes between them and other groups are considered non-civilizational conflicts.
Seventh, indigenous peoples constitute a category of minority found throughout the world which does not fit into any of his civilizations yet is clearly distinct from the others. Despite differing in their race and culture, indigenous peoples have a common historical experience that in many ways makes them more like each other than like any of Huntington's civilizations. 6 For this reason, while not considered a separate civilization, indigenous groups are considered a separate category from other civilizations, and conflicts involving indigenous groups are considered a third category in addition to intercivilizational and noncivilizational conflicts. That is, while indigenous groups are placed in a separate category for analysis, they are not considered a separate civilization, and conflicts involving them are not considered civilizational. This seems to be the most reasonable way to deal with a large number of minority groups that do not fit into any of Huntington's classifications.
Finally, the MAR3 dataset is designed to assess the relationship between majority and minority groups within a state. The majority group is operationally defined as the group that controls the state. Accordingly, in cases of civil war, there is no such majority group. This only affects three states: Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Lebanon. All cases in Afghanistan are coded as not civilizational because all four major ethnic groups in the country are Islamic. In Bosnia, the three ethnic groupsthe Serbs, Croats, and Muslims -belong to three different civilizations (SlavicOrthodox, Western, and Islamic, respectively). Accordingly, these three cases are coded as civilizational conflicts. Similarly, Lebanon is ruled by a combination of Muslims and Christians. Accordingly, all of the cases in Lebanon are considered civilizational clashes. 7 From these codings, a variable measuring the extent of civilizational conflict involving Western and Islamic groups was created which divides all ethnic conflicts into the following categories:
( In addition, variables measuring whether Islamic or Western groups were involved in any ethnic conflicts, including those involving indigenous minorities, for both periods were collected and are assessed here.
Data Analysis and Discussion
The general breakdown of Islamic and Western involvement in civilizational conflicts, both during and after the Cold War, is given in Table I . Overall, there is little change in the level of civilizational conflict between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
During both periods, about 38% of ethnic conflicts were civilizational. 9 In addition, only a very small minority of ethnic conflicts were between the Islamic and Western civilizations, about 5.6% during the Cold War and about 6.7% after the Cold War (about 14.6% and 18.3% of civilizational conflicts, respectively).
Islamic groups were involved in 109 ethnic conflicts during the post-Cold War period, 38 as the minority group, 33 as the majority group, and 38 in which both groups are Islamic. Of these conflicts, about 62.4% were civilizational. The results for the Cold War era are similar, with about 63.5% of 85 ethnic conflicts involving Islamic groups being civilizational. Conflicts involving Islamic groups were also the majority of civilizational ethnic conflicts, both during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War these conflicts constituted about 60.7% of civilizational ethnic conflicts, and in the post-Cold War era about 65.4%. That the majority of civilizational ethnic conflicts involve Islamic groups, and the majority of ethnic conflicts involving Islamic groups are civilizational, lends support to Huntington's thesis that Islam is one of the greatest participants in civilizational conflicts. However, that these proportions of Islamic involvement in civilizational ethnic conflict have changed very little since the end of the Cold War contradicts Huntington's argument that this is something new to the post-Cold War era. Also, only a minority of ethnic conflicts involving Islamic groups are with the West: about 17.4% after the Cold War and about 15.3% during it.
Western groups were involved in 59 ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era, 16 as the minority group, 32 as the majority group, and 11 in which both groups were
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Western. Of these, about 59.3% were civilizational. conflict. However, this is not new to the postCold War era. Also, contrary to Huntington's predictions, Islam versus West conflicts are a minority of civilizational conflicts, and civilizational conflicts are a minority of all ethnic conflicts. In addition, despite Huntington's predictions, the distribution of ethnic conflicts between and within civilizations did not change substantially with the end of the Cold War, with the largest shift in Table I being a shift of only 2.8%. In other words, the proportional increase in civilizational conflict that Huntington predicted would occur after the end of the Cold War has not occurred, at least as of 1998. 10
Examining the Results from Global, Islamic, and Western Perspectives
Overall, the results presented here do not support Huntington's contention that the end of the Cold War has changed the nature of ethnic conflict, or, as he calls it, 'fault-line' conflicts within states. However, these results do shed some light on how Huntington may have reached his conclusions, especially the conclusion that the Islamic civilization will pose the greatest threat to the Western civilization. It is argued here that the key to understanding Huntington is the perspective from which one views ethnic conflict. In this work, ethnic conflict was examined from three perspectives, a global perspective, an Islamic perspective, and a Western perspective. From a global perspective, Huntington's arguments do not hold up. There is almost no change in the distribution of ethnic conflict between civilizational and non-civilizational conflict between the eras. Both during and after the Cold War, civilizational conflicts were and remain a minority of ethnic conflicts. In addition, there was little change in the distribution between types of civilizational conflicts that is consistent with Huntington's predictions, except a small rise in the proportion of conflicts between the Western and Islamic civilizations. Thus, with this one important exception, from a global perspective there has been no major change in the types of ethnic conflict after the end of the Cold War except for a rise in the total number of ethnic conflicts.
These results are consistent with the findings of a study by Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000) on militarized interstate disputes from the period 1950-92. They found, among other things, that intracivilizational conflicts were more likely than intercivilizational conflicts, that civilizational conflicts, if anything, waned as the Cold War ended, and that Huntington's West versus the rest and Islamic threat to the West predictions were unfounded. These findings are also consistent with those of Henderson (1997 Henderson ( , 1998 ) that cultural factors do not have a unidirectional impact on international war. Similarly, Henderson & Singer (2000) show that political factors have a greater influence on civil wars than cultural ones, and Ellingsen (2000) found that there is no real change in the dynamics of ethnic conflict from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Thus, the global findings presented here are in line with the findings of other studies using other datasets. 11
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From the perspective of the Islamic civilization, there has also been little change since the end of the Cold War. Islamic ethnic groups, both during and after the Cold War, have been involved in the majority of civilizational conflicts, and the majority of conflicts involving Islamic ethnic groups have been civilizational. Also, both during and after the end of the Cold War conflicts with Western ethnic groups have been a minority of those conflicts involving Islamic ethnic groups. Thus from an Islamic perspective, the fact that there are many civilizational clashes between Islamic and Western groups is part of an overall pattern of Islamic ethnic groups being involved in many civilizational clashes in general. That is, the Islamic civilization is not conflicting in particular with the West, it is in conflict with other civilizations in general. In fact, in the post-Cold War era there are more ethnic clashes between the Islamic civilization and the Slavic-Orthodox (21) civilization than between the Islamic and Western civilizations (19). There are also a significant number of ethnic clashes between the Islamic civilization and the African (13), Confucian/Sinic (8), and Hindu (6) civilizations. In addition, this phenomenon of Islamic ethnic groups participating in a large number of civilizational conflicts is not new to the post-Cold War era.
From the perspective of the Western civilization, however, there is some justification for some, but not all, of Huntington's arguments. The majority of ethnic conflicts involving the West both during and after the Cold War have been civilizational. Also, the majority of post-Cold War civilizational ethnic conflicts involving the West are with Islamic groups, and, as noted earlier, this is new to the post-Cold War era. Thus, while Western involvement in civilizational ethnic conflicts has risen at about the same rate as that of other civilizations, much of this rise has been an increase in civilizational ethnic conflict with Islamic groups.
Conclusions
This result, that from a broader global perspective and from the perspective of the Islamic civilization there has been no major change in the distribution of types of ethnic conflict but from the perspective of the Western civilization there has been a numerical and proportional increase in civilizational conflict with the Islamic civilization, provides some insight into the debate over Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' argument. Huntington is from the West, and, presumably, this has influenced his perspective on the events that have transpired since the end of the Cold War. Looking at ethnic conflict strictly from the perspective on the West, the number and proportion of ethnic conflicts with Islamic groups have increased since the end of the Cold War. However, from a more global perspective, civilizational conflicts have, at least since 1945, been and remain a minority of ethnic conflicts. Also, from the perspective of the Islamic civilization, there has been little change since the end of the Cold War. Thus, while the small increase in ethnic conflict between the Western and Islamic civilizations can seem very important to Western eyes, such as those of Huntington, from the global and Islamic perspectives it is merely a small increase that has occurred in the context of a general rise in ethnic conflict.
This, perhaps, explains the intensity of the debate over whether there is an Islamic threat to the West. On the one hand, this clearly seems to be the case from a Western perspective. It explains why even some of Huntington's critics, like Hassner (1997) and Heilbrunn (1998) , believe there may be something to Huntington's arguments with regard to clashes between the Western and Islamic civilizations. On the other hand, looking at the overall picture shows that these conflicts are a minority of the ethnic conflicts in which Islamic ethnic groups are involved.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 38 / number 4 / july 2001 Similarly, from an Islamic perspective, the majority of ethnic conflicts involving Islamic groups are civilizational, as Huntington predicts, but looking at it from a broader perspective this is not new to the post-Cold War era, and the majority of civilizational conflicts involving the Islamic civilization are not with the West. Finally, it is important to reiterate that these results are limited to ethnic conflicts between majority and minority groups. That is, the conflicts analyzed here address only 'fault line' conflicts within states and do not address 'fault line' conflicts between states or 'core state conflicts'. Thus, a logical avenue for further research would be to test Huntington's arguments regarding these other types of civilizational conflicts from multiple perspectives.
